

be blind and to hold the scales evenly—it will not stand the test. Hence when people make this remark it shows that they are very ignorant of the principles of jurisprudence, of the rights of man, of the obligations that the nation sustains to its people, or the people to the nation.

But what I wanted particularly to arrive at are the principles associated with this case that has come up before you, and I will try and show you why and how these difficulties have occurred between these parties.

Sister Ferguson—who according to the evidence we have had, and from questions presented, and remarks made—evidently is a lady of intelligence and very well acquainted with medical affairs, and as such she was appointed House Surgeon of the Deseret Hospital. From this position she was removed. And here comes in a principle that I wish to speak upon.

In this city we have a cooperative institution. I refer to it because it is an institution with which we are all familiar. I have already referred, in what has been read, to the nature of its organization, and the kind of government by which it is carried on. There are quite a number of employees in the institution—some 150 or 200. There is a Board of Directors, and there is a president and a superintendent. The superintendent seems to be the man upon whom rests the greatest responsibility, and he is responsible to the directors for all his acts. As stated already, he makes the purchases or orders them made; he disposes of the goods, or orders them disposed of. He makes arrangements for all its business transactions, and he reports to the directors, monthly, the status

of the institution. In his hands is placed the power to manipulate and regulate the affairs thereof. If some person in that institution—he may be a good man—is incompetent, he uses his discretion in removing that man. He requires men that are acquainted with the business that he is associated with: and although this may be a very good man, the superintendent may think it proper, in the interests of the institution to have him removed. He uses his authority and has him removed because of his incompetency. The man who is dismissed may feel aggrieved. He may think he is competent: and it is difficult in all such circumstances to meet the wishes and views of all these people. Hence the necessity of a wise discretion. “But,” says the man, “I am a good Latter-day Saint.” “Very well, that may be; but, then, because you are a good Latter-day Saint, you may not be a good blacksmith, a good carpenter, or a good shoemaker, or you may not be—to come to their terms—a good salesman, one who comprehends the value of goods and the wants and interests of the business.”

Now, a great many questions arise out of these things, and how far they shall go and how far they shall not. On the other hand there may be a man who is very competent. I could refer to some of these and yet they are not good men. “Well,” says one, “we don’t want such persons as these in our institution. Although they are competent men and well acquainted with the business, I am afraid their example and influence would be pernicious, and we don’t want them; and we think we would have a right to act in such a case.” So they would think anywhere. The same thing would